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Abstract: It is commonly assumed that the concept of mechanism is a keytool for 
the scientific understanding of observable phenomena. However, there is no single 
definition of mechanism in the current philosophy of science. In fact, philosophers 
have developed several characterizations of what seemed to be a clear intuitive 
concept for scientists.
In this paper, I will analyze these philosophical conceptions of mechanism, 
highlighting their problematic aspects and proposing a new mechanistic approach 
based on the idea that the pertinent levels of organization for a mechanistic 
explanation can be identified with intervals of quasi-decompositionality. I argue 
that this approach allows us to consider that activities are directly derived from the 
entities’ structure. Consequently, a mechanistic explanation implies an arbitrary but 
not capricious choice of an organizational level. According to this approach, inter-
level causation is merely apparent and there is no place for emergent properties.
Keywords: mechanisms, emergent properties, quasi-decompositionality, systems.
Introduction
From a scientific perspective, observable phenomena are the result of the interactions of the elements underlying a given phenomenon. Thus, 
the luminous phase of photosynthesis is produced by a series of interactions 
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among certain components of the green parts of plants. Explaining how 
photosynthesis takes place consists of defining, describing and locating the 
elements involved in that process and the relationships between them. For 
scientists, this is considered to describe a mechanism and, by extension, to 
do science. (Machamer et al. 2000, 2)
This claim, which could be summarized by saying that a mechanism 
is a set of parts that interact among themselves to give rise to a phenomenon, 
does not have, from a philosophical perspective, a single characterization. 
Instead, there are several different descriptions that attempt to capture 
the way scientists work. For example, (a) Machamer, Darden and Craver 
(hereafter MDC) affirm that “mechanisms are entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish 
or termination conditions” (Machamer et al 2000, 3); for Glennan (b) A 
mechanism is a set of parties whose interaction gives rise to a phenomenon, 
where such interaction “can be characterized by direct, invariant and change-
related generalizations” (Glennan 2002, S334), or its most recent minimum 
mechanism, in which “a mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or 
parts) whose activities and interactions are organized so as to be responsible for 
the phenomenon.” (Glennan 2017, 17); and (c) Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
argue that “A mechanism is a structure that performs a function in virtue of its 
components parts, component operations, and their organization”. Phenomena 
are responsible for the smooth functioning of the mechanism. (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005, 423).
However, although there is not a consensus about the definition 
of mechanism, there are different aspects that are included in all these 
approaches. In this paper, I will analyze these aspects and propose a new 
mechanistic approach that will be able to address all them avoiding the 
problematic issues of classical mechanistic accounts.
2. The mechanistic proposal
It can be said that, in general terms, the different mechanistic proposals 
share the following four aspects, most of them already described in the 
foundational paper “Thinking about Mechanisms” (Machamer et al. 2000): 
First, mechanisms are formed by identifiable entities with certain stable and 
physically detectable characteristics that can be used to intervene in other 
processes, in addition to being physiologically plausible and relevant to 
explain the phenomenon under study (Craver 2006, 371). Second,
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In addition to entities, second, mechanisms are formed by activities 
(Machamer et al. 2000), interactions (Glennan 1996), or operations (Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen 2005). Despite being intuitively the same concept, MCD 
underline an identical ontological consideration between activities and 
entities, which although still defended by one of its main developers, Carl 
Craver (2007, 64, 171, 177, 189), (2013, 7) is also criticized by authors like 
Kuhlmann and Glennan (2014) and Glennan (2017, 21). Third, although 
there is no consensus on how causality should be understood, it is agreed that 
mechanisms play a causal role in the occurrence of the phenomenon. It can 
be argued that the causal approach to mechanicism was firstly dominated by 
Wesley Salmon’s (Salmon 1994) and Phil Dowe’s (Dowe 2000) approach 
to the conserved quantities, and is now in the line of the manipulability 
theories of causation, such as the account developed by James Woodward 
(2003). However, there are also other causal approaches such as that derived 
from Glennan’s own mechanicism (Glennan 1996) or Craver’s constitutive 
approach. Fourth, the organization to which the mechanistic approach refers 
to typically corresponds to the hierarchical structure of many of the systems 
studied by scientists. Each component of a mechanism can also be itself a 
mechanism susceptible of being broken down into further mechanisms, 
which introduces the idea of levels of organization into the mechanistic 
framework. (Machamer et al 2000, 13)
The idea of level of organization is one of the core notions for scientific 
research, since the choice of level depends on the entities, the actions that 
these entities carry out and the causal relationships among them. For 
instance, Craver (2007, 171) chooses the levels of mechanisms as the most 
valid option for carrying out an explanation, rejecting the classical view 
proposed by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958, 9) and the “refined” version of 
Wimsatt (1976, 253), that is, elementary particles, atoms, molecules, cells, 
multicellular living beings and social groups. A mechanism level is chosen, 
not only because of its entities, but also because of its activities. In other 
words, the election of the level or organization is function-oriented (cf. 
Garson 2013).
However, Craver’s decomposition of the levels gives rise to some 
difficulties. As noticed above, for Craver, a single-level element can be 
recursively broken down into sub-elements. However, it cannot be said 
that the resulting hierarchies are comparable, so that the sub-levels are out 
of sync. Therefore, as Craver and Bechtel point out, the size of the entities 
involved is not important, as a virus and a human may be at the same level of 
mechanism and interact with each other. From this contextual definition of 
mechanism, they attempt to explain downward causation without top-down 
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causes (Craver and Bechtel 2006, 556) and exclude from their analysis 
strongly emerging properties on the basis that they are emergent only with 
respect to a different level of characterization. However, most mechanicists 
advocate a mechanistic or organizational emergency in which superior 
properties are not directly derivable from those of their components because 
they are organization-dependent (Craver and Tabery 2017).
Despite the usefulness and ubiquity of the mechanistic explanation, I will 
argue that mechanism-level characterization is responsible for the difficulties 
cited above. In this paper, I will show how the notion of mechanism can be 
complemented with a new proposal that interprets the levels of organization 
of the matter as intervals of quasi-decompositionality (ICD), which will 
allow us to derive activities from the structure of the entities involved. This 
implies to make an arbitrary but not capricious choice of organizational level, 
explaining interlevel causation as merely apparent and avoiding the idea of 
emergent properties.
3. Intervals of quasi-decompositionality
I propose to depart from the idea of nearly-decomposable systems 
introduced by Simon in 1962. According to this proposal, certain systems can 
be split according to an arbitrary value ε into subsystems that are influenced 
only in an aggregative way. Unlike Simon’s, my proposal considers the 
impossibility of distinguishing types of partitions according to their mutual 
influence, because no matter how small the influence between two partitions 
of a system is, it will never be null and void, meaning that the main premise 
in his account is never met. Even in the aggregated systems considered by 
Wimsatt (1997, S375), it can be found that the resulting properties assume 
more than mere accumulation. This can be seen by the classical example of a 
making a pile of sand, as not only does the mass and volume of the pile change, 
but the degree of compaction changes as well, therefore the density changes 
and properties such as fluidity appear. Therefore, I propose to eliminate the 
possibility of partitioning nature into decomposable elements, understood 
as those that are not influenced, and to consider that every material is a 
continuum in the purest style of (Weiss 1970, 7).
From this starting-point, properly justified in Cáceres and Saborido 
(2017; 2018), it can be stated that, if instead of taking a single criterion of 
decompositionality ε we take several criteria, it is possible to quasi-decompose 
the continuous material in the levels of organization of the matter (longitudinal 
intervals). In this way, one can decide on a value for ε that will provide us with a 
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fundamental or microscopic aproblematic2 level F that delimit the partitions at 
the most basic level. Following Simon, this value could be based on the energy 
that holds matter together. For example, we can consider as a fundamental 
level the one that delimits the stability of the atomic nucleus ciphered around 
8 MeV, a sufficiently high value to consider this level as “aproblematic”. 
With lower values, we could take the energy figures that delimit the chemical 
bond, especially the covalent3, so that we would have defined a second quasi-
decompositionality interval (ICD) that would determine the molecules. 
Below this energy level would be the molecules and above this the associations 
of molecules. However, this choice is not without problems, as there are 
covalent bonds with a binding energy almost equal to that of some molecular 
interactions4. This only underlines the fact that quasi-decompositionality is 
ubiquitous and that the choice of values in ε is essentially heuristic. Thus, the 
same energetic criterion allows us to continue quasi-decomposing matter in 
successive mesoscopic nested levels (mi) in until we reach a macroscopic level 
M that would encompass all matter. In this arbitrary but not capricious way, 
we can establish levels as quasi-decompositionality intervals equivalent to the 
classic atomic, molecular, cellular, organism, population and ecosystem levels, 
which partition nature into atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, populations, 
etc. This approach could provide the robustness that Glennan calls for when 
he says that “parts of the mechanisms must have a kind of robustness and reality 
other than their place within that mechanism. In principle, it should be possible to 
take the part of the mechanism out and consider its properties in another context” 
(Glennan 1996, 53).
Once a criterion has been established to decompose nature, we must 
select the ICD of our interest according to the phenomenon under study. 
2 Level F is the level of the fundamental particles described by Physics, a level that is usually 
considered to be the ultimate level that constitutes the basis for ontological reductionism. The 
Standard Particle Model considers that there are two types of particles, leptons and quarks, that 
lack internal structure, so they are considered truly fundamental particles. However, the stability 
of the atomic nucleus is so great that it can be considered as aproblematic level when it comes 
to its difficult decomposition. In addition to MDC, who considered this level to be "aproble-
matic", Glennan (1996, 50) also referred to this fundamental level and has worked on the com-
patibility of the quantum level with the mechanistic explanations (Kuhlmann and Glennan 
2014). From Physics, Roger Penrose (1991, 374-5) clarifies the difference between the quantum 
and the classical level, explicitly pointing out that the difficulties of current Physics do not really 
pose a challenge to the reductionist approach.
3 Among them would be the ionization energies, so we could take the ions as an intermediate 
level.
4 There are tremendously disparate covalent bond energies between them, for example, the 
EO-H is 500 KJ/mol while the EF-F is 160 KJ/mol. However, the energy of the hydrogen bond 
EF-H---F, a non-molecular bond, is 155 KJ/mol.
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Take, for example, the nutrition of vegetables. We can study this phenomenon 
from different perspectives. We can, for example, evaluate the energy flows 
from the sun and how they affect a forest, how they are transformed into 
plant matter, how they affect animal life, the climate, etc. We can also focus 
the study on how the light is captured by the plants through the leaves, how 
the flow of water and salts ascends through the xylem and how the sap is then 
distributed through the phloem, how the stomas of the leaves serve as an air 
and water vapour exchange zone, etc. But our interest may lie in the capture 
of energy from photons by protein photosystems, such as tilacoid molecules, 
that follow a sequence of oxidations and reductions that channel this energy, 
and how it is used to convert carbon dioxide and water into organic matter. 
Ecology, plant physiology or molecular biology will be the sciences responsible 
for carrying out these investigations.
Once the ICDs and their elements have been defined, a specific science 
will describe them structurally and functionally according to its methodology. 
Thus, ecology will not even distinguish species or will only distinguish them in 
terms of flow values, plant physiology will focus on the individual organism, 
and molecular biology on the chloroplast. Each field of science will develop 
its own methodology and language according to its own purposes, taking 
only those inputs and outputs it considers necessary and establishing a model 
system that will simplify reality heuristically. In this particular example, the 
concept of photosynthesis itself has a meaning related to matter and energy 
flows for ecology, fluids in plant physiology, and electrons in molecular biology. 
That is, when ecologists, physiologists and molecular biologists talk about 
photosynthesis, they mean different things. This is amplified as we ascend in 
level so that the observed generalizations will be equally inaccurate although 
they may be explanatory and predictive.
Each of the above sciences goes one step further in simplification. For 
example, molecular biology treats chloroplast as if it were what Bertalanffy calls 
an “equifinal state” (Bertalanffy 1976, 147), i.e. it does not consider concrete 
chloroplasts, but rather idealizations of chloroplast formed by a complex of a 
priori selected interacting elements. These sciences will take this partition as 
their object of study, considering only the component parts it deems appropriate 
to explain what is of its interest. Thus, ecology will consider ecosystems and 
individuals and their functioning, physiology will consider cells, and molecular 
biology will consider atoms and ions. From this, we can infer that each science, 
in addition to its own ε, uses as sub-quasi-decompositionaliy criteria (εisub) those 
of the sciences located at lower levels. Consequently, the sciences that investigate 
mesoscopic levels consider the immediately superior levels, and in a similar way 
they take the criteria of quasi-decompositionality of the sciences of the superior 
21Intervals of quasi-decompositionality and mechanistic explanations
levels as criteria of supra-quasi-decompositionality (εjsupra). Thus, with the choice 
of the levels at which a science has secondary competence, what can be called 
the extended quasi-decompositionality range IA(i, j) =[εisub, εjsupra] is established.
This modeling, i.e. the description of a quasi-decompositionality 
interval with respect to the properties of that interval according to the science 
methodology of its level, implies an important simplification. A given level can 
be seen as a box to be opened by the science in charge of its study. In doing 
so, scientists will see that its interior is occupied by other enclosed boxes made 
up of lower-level systems, which are also studied by another science. Each box 
contains new boxes that correspond to another level and another science. This 
nesting of boxes would end at level F below and level M above. Therefore, it 
is inevitable that there will always be a loss of information that will have an 
important influence on the observation of regularities and therefore on the 
establishment of laws. The loss comes from taking as “real” values from the 
biases introduced when selecting the level, using a methodology, simplifying 
the previous interval, considering decomposability, etc. In addition, not all 
the variables that form part of a subsystem are used to describe them, but only 
those detected or considered relevant.
4. Mechanical systems
From this approach, only F-level entities have non-decomposable 
properties, while entities at all other levels will have a set of properties resulting 
from the simplification made when making the level choice. Therefore, an 
F-level entity will carry out actions based on their non-decomposable properties 
are ultimately due to their nature.
I label the result of the simplification made after choosing an ICD 
as a system-entity. This simplification involves not only the structural 
characterization, but also the selection of certain properties relevant to the 
explanation, which I call level properties. The system-entities are only arbitrarily 
stable, contrary to the idea of the classical entity of mechanicism. For example, 
following the example of photosynthesis, once the molecular level has been 
chosen, we can characterize RuBisCO (ribulose-1,5-bisphosphate carboxylase/
oxygenase) as the protein that carries out the first reaction of atmospheric CO2 
fixation, that is, the enzyme that initiates the transformation of inorganic to 
organic matter. We do not characterize this protein by its structure, which is 
very variable in all autotrophs that have it, but by some of its functions. In 
particular, we do it based on its carboxylase action, which initiates the dark 
phase of photosynthesis, and because of its oxygenase function, opposite to the 
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previous one, and which reduces the efficiency of photosynthesis (Navarro 
2005, 5-9). Therefore, the RuBisCO is a modeling of a molecule that has 
some level properties that help us to explain the phenomenon that interests us, 
that is, photosynthesis. Therefore, the RuBisCO is a system-entity with certain 
level properties. Both its structure and properties are fully deductible from the 
lower level, despite the fact that they appear to be emergent properties.
The system-entities interact with others of the same level according 
to their level properties, configuring a mechanism that, seen from a higher 
perspective, supposes a system-entity of the next level.
In this way, we can define mechanosystem as follows:
A mechanosystem (MS) is a set of system-entities (S-E) belonging to a quasi-
decompositionality interval (ICD) whose organization is due exclusively to the 
properties (P) of its components.
MS = df (ICD, S-E, P)
Where:
• the ICD is chosen according to the interest of the observer
• S-E is an entity-system and, at the same time, a mechanism of a 
lower ICD
• P are selected level properties of the previous ICD
The particles of the fundamental level describe salmonian world lines5, 
and when they interact with those of other particles of the same level they 
exchange preserved quantities. Each nexus involves a causal interaction. 
Thus, the Salmonian view of world lines with a non-zero value of a conserved 
quantity and the intersection of these forming world networks is valid only 
for the fundamental level. As we ascend the level and speak, for example, of a 
molecule of water, we see how its atoms describe lines of world so that from 
a higher ICD it is perceived as a single thicker line, which will intersect with 
others in non-punctual nodes. As we move up more levels, the simplifications 
made in determining the mechanosystems introduce errors that accumulate 
making it difficult to detect the nodes. A set of water molecules together with a 
set of certain mineral salts can be seen as a concrete entity-system —the sap— 
that, at a higher level of analysis, serves to explain the ascension of nutrients by 
the capillarity of the trachea of the xylem. Similarly, the property “capillarity” 
is only observable at this level and, although it can be explained from the 
properties of its component elements, it is more easily distinguished by the 
properties of the level from which it is analysed, such as surface tension or 
density. Again, it can be said that this level property seems to emerge from 
5 A world line is the collection of points in a spacetime (Minkowski) diagram that represents 
the history of an object." (Dowe 2000, 90).
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its components as a qualitative novelty, but it is actually nothing more than a 
phenomenon that can be explained in terms of the underlying level properties.
An interlevel observer will see that a fundamental F0 situation will be 
caused by another previous F-1, its corresponding mesoscopic m0 will be caused 
by m-1 and the upper macroscopic M0 will be caused by a previous M-1. When 
zooming in, the viewer cannot encompass the entire macroscopic phenomenon 
so he focuses on some aspect of the lower level, losing perspective. The 
ecologist is interested in balances, the physiologist in flows, the molecular 
biologist in chemical reactions. However, interactions take place exclusively 
at the fundamental level and therefore causality exists only at this level. For 
instance, the RuBisCO does not come into contact with CO2 as a whole, but 
only certain atoms of certain amino acids in that protein do so, meaning that 
such interaction is only real at the atomic level.. This gives us an idea of the 
arbitrariness of the choice of ICDs, because even if we choose elements of the 
same level, we observe that there is no real causal interaction between them.
Hence, from this perspective the interaction between elements of different 
sizes proposed by Craver (Craver and Bechtel 2006, 456-7) is problematic . 
It is true that scientists speak this way when referring to molecular mechanisms, 
but making a leap of at most one level. An explanation of the catalytic reaction 
of RuBisCO and CO2 includes expressions such as “binding of RuBisCO 
and CO2 to the previously activated catalytic site”, “formation of 2,3-enodiol by 
C3 deprotonation”, “nucleophilic attack of CO2 in C2”, “hydration in C3” and 
“deprotonation at C3-O level, which initiates the breakdown of the C2-C3 bond 
leading to two 3-phospho-D-glycerate molecules” (Navarro 2005, 6).
When all the levels are observed at the same time, it is intuitive to analyze 
diachronic aspects as if they were synchronic, avoiding the differential of 
elapsed time dt and mistaking the causal explanation for the internal identity 
relationship. In this way, we run the risk of concluding that F-1 causes M0 
and M0 causes F+1, generating a false sense of upward and downward causality 
which, in reality, this is only apparent.
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Thus, the nucleophilic attack of CO2 leads to an electronic 
rearrangement, which seen from a molecular perspective, is the breaking of 
a molecule into two. If we ignore dt we could believe that the nucleophilic 
attack is the cause of the formation of the two molecules, understanding 
therefore that there is an ascending causality. It is also common to express 
in the form of downward causation that RuBisCO maintains its active sites, 
when it really depends on the sequence of the amino acid’s atoms and their 
interaction with the dissolving water.
If we consider, as this approach does, that the world is, ontologically, 
a material continuum, a criterion for the choice of mechanosystems 
should be defined. The first thing to do would be to determine the quasi-
decompositionality interval. In principle, each science will choose as ICD 
the one that is part of its domain. Ecology, physiology and molecular biology 
will choose their respective ICDs. Once these levels have been established, it 
would be necessary to define which of the S-E’s at that level are the ones that 
form part of the mechanism and, therefore, describe certain relevant level 
properties. Here we find two possible strategies: a) the elements are chosen, 
their properties are analyzed and the phenomena that occur are observed or 
b) the phenomena are chosen and the components and properties involved 
in their implementation are studied. Again, the decision between the two 
options is purely heuristic, being in general choice b) the most widely 
used in science. The recursive search for lower levels builds a nested set of 
mechanosystems. However, this top-down analysis from the phenomenon 
to the S-E has the disadvantage of excluding elements from the mechanism 
not only because of ignorance or errors, but also because of the quasi-
decompositionality criterion that is assumed. A complementary bottom-up 
study from the S-E to the phenomenon can help to better understand the 
functioning of the mechanism and to better characterize the properties. In the 
example of photosynthesis, investigating the underlying components of this 
plant phenomenon resulted in the discovery of the RuBisCO and its function. 
But it was also discovered that the same enzyme is the one that catalyzes 
photorespiration, the “opposite” phenomenon to photosynthesis. A similar 
case is that of the so-called multifunctional or moonlighting proteins, which 
are those that perform different functions depending on their environment. 
A striking example is that of intrinsically denatured proteins (PINE) that 
are capable of changing their conformation, binding different ligands and 
performing different functions depending on environmental conditions 
(Cuevas-Velázquez and Covarrubias-Robles 2011). In order to analyze 
this type of protein it is very effective to examine its behavior once it has been 
identified and biochemically described.
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5. Conclusions
The consideration that mechanical systems6 are quasi-decomposable 
allows us to develop an approach according to which levels of organization are 
heuristically deduced according to the entities of the system and their specific 
properties. The system-entities (S-E’s) are interrelated, resulting in a multitude 
of outcomes some of which are subject to investigation. The organization of 
S-E’s depends exclusively on their level properties, so the consideration of 
emergency, as J. S. Mill already pointed out, becomes an epistemic question 
(Mill 1843, 267). Depending on the level of the phenomenon which we 
are interested in, we will carry out our research by isolating the components 
that are important to us, thus describing a mechanism. Thus, for example, 
for ecology, photosynthesis is important because it leads to the production 
of organic matter and the beginning of food webs and the balances of matter 
and energy. Its entities would therefore be the plant populations. For plant 
physiology, photosynthesis is important because it is the form of nutrition of 
individual plants and governs their life. Its entities are therefore the organs 
involved, such as the leaves, roots, xylem and phloem beams and, in a lower 
step, the stomas of the leaves, the trabeculae of the conductive vessels, the 
absorbent hairs, etc. For cellular and molecular biology, photosynthesis is the 
fixation of inorganic carbon to organic matter. Its entities are the pigments 
of photosystems, light photons, enzymes such as RuBisCO and transformed 
molecules. And research can also be done at more basic levels, as is the case in 
recent studies of quantum effects in photosynthesis (Thyrhaug et al. 2018).
In conclusion, this proposal aims to enrich the neo-mechanicist view with 
a systemic, reductionist and non-eliminationist approach that understands the 
need to address the different levels of study from their own perspective with a 
practical aim.
6 Although some authors claim that a mechanism can be a set of processes, which have a less 
stable configuration (Illari and Williamson 2012; Glennan 2017) the approach developed 
here interprets mechanisms as systems in which is possible to identify quasi-decomposable in-
tervals.
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